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Abstract: Despite some of the more rapid rates of economic growth seen in Pakistan in years, the government of Paki-
stan’s Pervez Musharraf was soundly rejected by voters in early 2008. To the surprise of many observers, it was the econ-
omy, rather than increased violence, the war on terrorism, or the authoritarian nature of the regime that was the prime 
concern of electorate. It appears that much of the macro-economic successes did not trickle down very far – increased in-
come inequalities and regional disparities, rising inflation only added to the electorate’s frustrations. After examining the 
country’s pattern of growth and the results of Musharraf’s economic programs, a more fundamental criticism can be made 
– the economic development model adopted over the last eight years is unlikely to have laid a solid foundation for further 
growth.  
INTRODUCTION 
 The February 19, 2008 election defeat of Pakistan’s 
President Pervez Musharraf was not a major surprise. When 
asked to list the most important issue for voters, most ob-
servers of the Pakistan scene would list factors such as: (a) 
the deteriorating security situation evidenced by the increase 
in terrorist attacks over the past year, (b) the suppression of 
civil rights through President Pervez Musharraf's heavy-
handed sacking of the country's top judges, (c) the unpopular 
partnership with the United States in the war on terrorism, 
(d) the rise and spread of extremism, and (e) the suspicious 
assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Sur-
prisingly, for most voters a more basic set of issues pre-
vailed:  
People were angry over the fact atta [flour] was not avail-
able, that food prices were high, and due to this they felt 
insecure. It's a familiar lament in Pakistan these days. We 
are worried about terrorism and those other things, but 
first we are worried about basic needs. People want a 
person who can fix this problem [1]. 
 Perhaps because Pakistan is viewed as having one of the 
best economic growth records in the region over the last 
eight years, economic factors were largely overlooked as 
contributing elements to the General’s electoral defeat. This 
perception was reinforced by the poor state of the economy 
inherited by Musharraf. During the 1990s Pakistan’s econ-
omy underperformed with per capita incomes averaging 
around 1% per annum. Several factors contributed to the 
country’s economic malaise. First the civilian ruling elites 
failed to make efficient use of public financial resources to 
boost economic growth, contain poverty, and develop human 
resources. Second these governments (B. Bhutto and N. 
Sharif) failed to check unbridled corruption and cronyism. 
The result was an increasing political use of public re-
sources, the bending of rules and regulations to benefit a 
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selected few and the erosion of any institutional accountabil-
ity [2].  
 Four key economic breakdowns evolved out of this envi-
ronment: (1) high fiscal deficits; (2) an unsustainable public 
debt (domestic and foreign) and (3) a sharp deterioration in 
the distribution of income; and (4) a disturbing rise in the 
level of unemployment [3] and poverty [4]. The reforms in-
troduced by the Musharraf administration after seizing 
power in October 1999 were clearly designed to address 
many these problems, including the country's massive pov-
erty, stagnant economic growth, deteriorating institutional 
framework and weak governance structures.  
 A day before being sworn in for a new five-year presi-
dential term that he arranged under a much criticized refer-
endum, General Musharraf noted that the next five years 
were very important for Pakistan and hoped that the new 
government would take advantage of the "sound macro-
economic policies" framed by his regime. "If Pakistan fol-
lows the course and implements the strategy that has been 
crafted after much deliberations and with great care, divi-
dends would soon be there for us to reap," he stated, further 
adding that his administration had [5] “pulled a rudderless 
ship out of the storm sail." In this regard, he noted that he 
and his colleagues took pride in the fact that after more than 
two decades of stagnation, they had "brought the country to a 
take-off stage" and it was now time for the elected govern-
ment to "build on the bricks laid by his team." Finally, he 
explained that he had taken certain difficult decisions in the 
larger and long-term interest of the country, and particularly, 
in the interest of its economic and political stability.  
 Musharraf's regime embraced globalization making struc-
tural reforms, opening the country to investment and trade. 
The results surprised even his most ardent supporters -- the 
size of the economy increased by almost 50 percent, with 
income per-capita up by nearly 25 percent. Cities and towns 
seem to be booming. The country managed to recover im-
pressively from the devastating earthquake in 2005 [6]. In 
short, the economic paradox of Muisharraf’s fall from grace 
2    The Open Area Studies Journal, 2008, Volume 1 Robert Looney 
is that the country’s economic performance was commend-
able by most standard measures: 
• In the last several years the economy has grown at rates 
between 7.0% and 7.5%. 
• The share of industry in GDP rose from 22.6% in 2000 to 
26.7% in 2006.  
• The annual percentage growth in industrial value added 
as doubled.  
• The share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP has 
increased by three percentage points. 
• The services sector has posted an impressive perform-
ance, with annual growth of the value added in services 
nearly doubling over the past seven years. 
• There are now 82 mobile phone subscribers per 1,000 
people up from two in 2000. 
 In a similar vein, Robert Hathaway has noted [7] that 
several recent and widely acclaimed books have “perpetuates 
a stereotype of a violence-ridden, military dominated, ex-
tremist Pakistan that does not convey the richness or vitality 
of the country…neither book for instance, explains the eco-
nomic confidence that is this moment, driving the construc-
tion of three new five-star hotels in Islamabad [8].”  
 Yet, despite the impressive economic recovery under 
Musharraf, his party want down to a stunning defeat with 
economic issues a major factor in contributing to its demise. 
What went wrong? How could such a surge in economic 
activity over the last eight years following a decade of stag-
nant growth culminate in such a sound rejection? What was 
associated with the Musharraf recovery that alienated broad 
segments of the Pakistani citizenry? 
 As the following sections demonstrate, objective evalua-
tions of the country’s economic performance during the 
Musharraf years are difficult as a mixed picture emerges. 
Clearly objectivity over the Musharraf programs has been 
colored by divergent perceptions – the product of a sharply 
polarized political environment [9]. Most observers of the 
country’s attempts at economic progress during this period 
fall, into two broad schools of interpretation: (1) the take-off 
school, and (2) the failed take-off school. Another school of 
thought, the structuralist or demolition school contends that 
no real acceleration in growth occurred under Musharraf – 
simply put, growth under Musharraf was the result of a 
number of fortuitous events – post 9/11 aid flows, good 
weather, high remittances from workers in the booming Gulf 
countries and the like. There is an element of truth to this 
interpretation. However, the high rates of growth achieved in 
Pakistan over the last five years cast considerable doubt on 
this interpretation – it simply doesn’t go far enough in ex-
plaining the economy’s recent dynamics.  
 At issue then is whether, as the take-off school contends, 
the Musharraf programs despite their wide-spread unpopu-
larity have positioned the economy on a path of high sus-
tained growth. The failed-take off school questions the 
sustainability of the current expansion. Its main proposition 
[10] is that developing countries like Pakistan evolve 
through various states with improved governance and in-
creased economic reforms paving the transition from one 
phase to another – without these institutional improvements 
growth in one stage cannot carry over to the next phase of 
development – a failed-take off.  
 This school suggests that the Musharraf years did not 
address many of the country’s underlying governance and 
economic constraints on growth and by not doing so have 
only positioned the country for yet another replication of 
past patterns of boom and bust. As developments in mid-
2007 and into 2008 suggest, there is abundant reason to as-
sume that the failed-take off school interpretation held by 
large masses of the population best captures the conse-
quences of Musharraf’s economic programs. 
KEY FACTORS LIMITING SUSTAINED GROWTH 
IN PRE-MUSHARRAF PAKISTAN 
 William Easterly has provided a good overview of the 
economic problems facing Musharraf upon seizing power in 
1989. In fact, Easterly has termed Pakistan’s experience as 
an illustration a “growth without development [11]”. East-
erly contends that over the years country’s poor social indi-
cators, have lowered the productive potential economy and 
its ability to service its high debt. While certain degree of 
development and growth was attainable with skilled manage-
rial elite and unskilled workers, over time, the economy en-
countered diminishing returns, as human capital did not 
grow at the same rate as the capital stock. Weak governance 
structures and limited economic reforms aids in explaining 
slowdown in growth in the years leading up to the Musharraf 
take-over.  
 More bluntly Shahid Husain [12] has attributed the coun-
try’s inability to sustain high growth to the following factors: 
1. An increase in the role of the state has coincided with a 
decline in governance. 
2. Non-competitive regimes politically and economically 
have resulted in rampant corruption and stagnation – the 
subversion of competitiveness was the central feature of 
Pakistani governments. 
3. There has been a continuous redistribution of wealth in 
favor of privileged. groups 
4. A hard crust of economic monopoly has stifled new 
growth and creativity. 
5. An erosion in the provision of public services has re-
sulted in a decline of the public’s trust in government 
which is seen a predatory. This, in turn, is linked to non-
payment of taxes, the corruption in tax administration, 
and the massive increase in borrowing. 
6. The quality of the civil bureaucracy is falling rapidly. A 
majority of civil servants are not even paid a living wage 
and this is tantamount to an incentive to corruption 
7. The irrelevance of the state in the lives of the people is 
exemplified by the total breakdown of law and order. 
8. The inability and unwillingness of the state to discharge 
its social services has meant a vacuum in social services. 
Pakistan’s literacy rate has remained almost unchanged 
since independence. The dependence on madrassahs (re-
ligious schools) is hence understandable. 
 From this, Hasain correctly concludes that little eco-
nomic progress, not alone a take-off is possible until the 
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government is able to re-establish its presence in the politi-
cal, social, and economic lives of the people. 
 These factors can all be grouped into a system character-
ized by the dominance of diversion over production. As 
Kazmi [13] notes:  
This dominance results in the unfettered exploitation of 
the real producers of goods and services and unchecked 
accumulation of wealth and resources by the ‘diverters’ 
in the society. The chief characteristics of the diversion 
based societies can be identified as the unjust property 
rights, the outdated judicial and legal framework, power-
lessness of the working classes, the ascendancy of feudal-
istic norms and a highly inefficient and corrupt govern-
ment machinery.  
 Finally, there is empirical support that the diversionary 
economy suffers from low productivity capable of stifling 
long periods of high growth. Hall and Jones (1996) have 
developed an index of anti-diversionary policy consisting of 
five main components. Two of the categories relate to the 
government’s role in protecting against private diversion: (1) 
law and order, and (2) bureaucratic quality. Three categories 
relate to the government’s possible role as a diverter: (1) 
corruption, (2) risk of expropriation, and (3) government 
repudiation of contracts. They find that an equal weighted 
index is highly correlated with output per worker. Bureau-
cratic quality, law and order along with corruption remain a 
problem in Pakistan with the other two elements presenting a 
lesser challenge.  
THE MUSHARRAF REFORM EFFORTS 
 For its part, the Musharraf administration appears to have 
recognized many of the growth impeding forces plaguing 
Pakistan over the years. Soon after taking power in October 
of 1999, the new government initiated a comprehensive mac-
roeconomic stabilization program as well as a series of re-
forms designed to address many of the economic and institu-
tional constraints limiting the country’s ability to sustain 
growth.  
The Musharraf Reforms 
 Specifically the strategy envisaged four key goals: 
1. Macroeconomic stability and the restoration of a working 
relationship with international financial institutions 
(mainly the IMF, World Bank and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank).  
2. Structural reforms to remove distortions in the economy. 
3. Improving governance, especially economic, and reviv-
ing key national institutions. 
4. Poverty alleviation measures. 
 The main thrust of the Musharraf reforms were to im-
prove not only the country’s economy, but, in addition its 
governance and key institutions. The agenda for improving 
governance is based on the devolution of power, improved 
public financial management/accountability, fighting corrup-
tion and civil service, judicial, and police reforms.  
 The implicit priorities underlying this approach are 
straightforward: good governance, economic revival based 
on strong fundamentals and freedom from debt and social 
harmony are interdependent goals. The overriding philoso-
phy of the Musharraf government is that distortions in the 
economy are great inhibitors in achieving these objectives 
and thus have to be removed. The government's economic 
team and the IMF and World Bank staff shared Musharraf's 
diagnosis of the problems confronting the economy and the 
prescriptions required to fix them.  
 In sum, the Musharraf reforms need to be seen as a proc-
ess unfolding over time. The first phase was to restore 
growth through macroeconomic stability and market reforms 
focused on increased total factor productivity and globaliza-
tion. The second stage was to develop a governance structure 
capable of sustaining growth over a longer period. 
The IMF Programs 
 IMF involvement in these reforms was not immediate. 
The relationship between Pakistan and the IMF in the early 
days of the Musharraf regime was strained. The IMF and its 
major contributors did not take the dismissal of a democrati-
cally elected government and the takeover by a military 
leader lightly. In addition, the new government had to inform 
the Fund about Pakistan's misreporting of the official deficit 
data for FY1998-99. As a result of these factors and the 
failed programs of the 1990s, the government lacked credi-
bility with the Fund. The failed programs in the 1990s only 
compounded the Fund's suspicion that the country was inca-
pable of delivering on its commitments. 
 Finally, around a year after the military coup that brought 
President Musharraf to power in Pakistan, the Executive 
Board of the IMF approved a Stand-by-Credit of U.S. $596 
million. The program was to run until the end of September 
2001, supporting the Government's economic program for 
2000-01. The program aimed to move Pakistan on to a high 
and sustainable growth path by strengthening its balance of 
payments position, rebuilding official reserves, and reducing 
public sector indebtedness. To support these objectives, the 
Government has strengthened macroeconomic policies and 
as noted above, developed a wide-ranging structural reform 
agenda that emphasizes revenue mobilization, improving 
investor confidence, poverty alleviation, and good govern-
ance. The IMF credit was subject to the following require-
ments: 
1. A reduction in the overall budget deficit in 2000-01 to 
5.2% of GDP from 6.4% in 1999-2000, with further con-
solidation over the medium term. This was to be 
achieved through increased tax collections, with a widen-
ing of the tax base, improved tax administration and strict 
expenditure controls. Since there is sufficient uncertainty 
surrounding the short-term impact of revenue measures 
on the budgetary position, the authorities should stand 
ready to take additional measures if revenues fall short of 
expectations.  
2. Increased spending by close to one-third on poverty re-
duction and decrease in less productive spending.  
3. An increase in gross official reserves from U.S. $1.114 
billion (at the start of the program) to U.S. $1.74 billion 
at the end of June 2001, equivalent to 7.3 weeks of im-
ports of goods and services, to be achieved through a 
flexible exchange rate policy, monetary tightening, fiscal 
adjustment, substantial exceptional financing, increased 
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exports and sharply reduced private sector capital out-
flows brought about by a restoration of investor confi-
dence.  
4. Adequate expenditure control mechanisms would be put 
in place to ensure that the defense budget remains within 
the agreed limit and does not exceed the allocations as 
had happened in 1999-2000, when it increased by R $7 
billion beyond the approved allocation.  
 The IMF terms were quite strict, but the country, after the 
many failures of the 1990s was in a very poor bargaining 
position. The country was on the verge of a serious financial 
collapse and the new government had assumed power with a 
commitment to avert this crisis.  
 The SBA was fully implemented without any problems. 
The country's improved standing with the IMF enabled the 
government to qualify for another IMF program, a three year 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) approved in 
2001 that is well underway. 
 As noted above, the Administration's economic strategy 
from the beginning was been relatively straight-forward: first 
stabilize the economy and then restructure. It was assumed 
that growth would return with stabilization. There are several 
implicit assumptions here: (1) Pakistan's tricky economic 
situation could not be addressed unless the donor community 
helped reduce the burden of debt the country carried; (2) to 
get the donors to help Pakistan, the country had to first suc-
cessfully complete an IMF stabilization program; and (3) 
once the burden of debt had become lighter, Pakistan would 
have the resources needed to jump-start the economy.  
 The strategy was predicated on creating an environment 
that will attract high inflows of private foreign investment. 
Without these foreign funds to supplement low domestic 
rates of savings, the country will not be able to return to re-
spectable rates of economic growth. The idea was that once 
growth was reestablished there would likely be adequate 
funds to combat terrorism on two fronts: (1) poverty reduc-
tion and improved governance; and (2) increased allocations 
to security and force modernization. With improved growth 
and modernization of institutions, the attractiveness of terror-
ism would diminish. In turn this would create an environ-
ment more conducive for further inflows of capital. In this 
sense, the IMF programs and the war on terrorism would 
complement each other. 
PROGRESS UNDER MUSHARRAF 
 The Take-Off School noted above contends that the eco-
nomic expansion initiated under Musharraf did not occur all 
of a sudden, but instead was the outcome of deliberate and 
carefully designed program of economic reforms undertaken 
(and some ongoing) during the first five years of the Mushar-
raf era. The program consisted of four key elements [14]: 
1. Restoration of macroeconomic stability and Pakistan’s 
relationship with the international financial institutions. 
2. Structural reforms to remove distortions 
3. Improving economic governance and reviving key insti-
tutions 
4. Poverty alleviation through targeted interventions and 
social safety nets. 
 The program was predicated on the assumption in Paki-
stan’s case of a strong interconnection between economic 
growth, poverty reduction, structural reforms and improved 
governance. Successfully undertaken these four key compo-
nents are capable of generating a virtuous circle of acceler-
ated growth, expanded reforms and poverty reduction. Or, as 
Ishrat Hussain observed: 
Macroeconomic stability and the consequent rapid eco-
nomic growth help reduce poverty in with investment in 
social sectors, targeted interventions and social safety 
nets. Structural reforms are needed to strengthen the un-
derpinning of macroeconomic policies and to remove mi-
croeconomic distortions affecting key sectors of the 
economy thus paving the way for accelerating economic 
growth. Improved governance affects the quality of 
growth by allocating realization of higher returns on in-
vestment and is also conducive to poverty reduction 
through better delivery of social services to the poor. 
Poverty reduction as we know by now can be achieved 
with rapid economic growth, structural reforms and im-
proved governance. 
 With this strategy in place, the take-off school led by 
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, Ishrat Hussain, Governor of 
the State Bank of Pakistan and the supporters [15] of the 
Musharraf Reforms and the IMF took heart in a long list of 
initial successes: 
• The fiscal deficit, which averaged 7.0 per cent of GDP 
for two decades, is expected to declined to 3.8 per cent in 
the fiscal year (2002-03).  
• Domestic debt, which was growing at an average rate of 
24.0 per cent and 16 per cent per annum during the 1980s 
and 1990s, respectively declined slightly in 2002-03.  
• Domestic debt as percentage of GDP has declined from 
52 per cent in 1999-2000 to 39.3 per cent in 2002-03.  
• Tax collection has increased by Rs152 billion during the 
last four years as opposed to Rs 82.5 billion in the previ-
ous four years, an increase of 84 per cent. From an aver-
age increase of 4.6 per cent per annum during 1996-99, 
tax collection has grown at an average rate of almost 14 
percent per annum during the next four years.  
• Inflation at 3.1 per cent in 2002-03 was below the target 
of 4.0 percent. It is much lower than the average of 10 
percent in the 1990s.  
• Private sector credit is up by 19 per cent during 2002-03.  
• Stock market remained buoyant during 2003, reaching 
the record level of 3100 (KSE index). It had been one of 
the world’s best performers in the early 2000s [16]. 
• Industrial production is up by 8.0 per cent during July-
February 2002-03.  
• Investment is likely to rise to 16 per cent of GDP and 
economic growth is projected at 4.5 per cent - higher than 
the average of last three years (3.3 per cent during 1999-
2000 to 2001-02).  
• Both exports and imports have picked up despite uncer-
tain global environment. Exports are up by 20 per cent 
and imports are up by 23 per cent during July-March 
2002-03.  
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• Pakistan's exports remained stagnated at around $8.0 
billion for six years (1994-95 to 1999-00), and at $9.0 
billion during the last two years and is expected to reach 
$10.5 billion this year.  
• Workers's remittances were around $1.0 billion in 1998-
99. This is likely to reach $ 4.3 billion by end-June 2003 
- all time high in the country's history.  
• Foreign investment was as low as $403 million in 1998-
99. It has already reached $665 million during July-
March 2002-03 and is expected to reach $1.0 billion by 
the end of the current fiscal year.  
• Most importantly, Pakistan's current account balance is in 
surplus. Pakistan has maintained current account deficit 
at around 5.0 per cent of GDP in the 1990s. This year the 
surplus is expected to reach $3.0 billion or 4.0 per cent of 
GDP - a major turnaround in the economy.  
• Strong build-up in reserves has strengthened Pakistani 
rupee viz US dollar. Exchange rate has appreciated by 11 
per cent since July 3, 2001.  
• Pakistan's external debt and foreign exchange liabilities 
which reached at unsustainable level by 1998-99 have 
started moving towards sustainability.  
• Pakistan's total external debt and liabilities have declined 
by $3.0 billion - from $38 billion to $35 billion. As per-
centage of GDP, the external debt and liabilities stood at 
64 per cent in end-June 1999, declined to 60 per cent in 
end-June 2002, and projected to decline to 50.4 per cent 
by end-June 2003.  
• During this period, Pakistan added $9.4 billion in its for-
eign exchange reserves. Hence, Pakistan has not only 
succeeded in reducing its debt liabilities by $3.0 billion 
but has also succeeded in adding $9.4 billion in its re-
serves.  
• Pakistan's net debt and liabilities (total external debt and 
liabilities minus net reserves of the SBP) stood at $37 bil-
lion in end-June 2000 and is expected to decline to $26 
billion by end-June 2003 - a reduction of $11.0 billion in 
three years. As percentage of GDP, it is projected to de-
cline from 60.7 per cent in end-June 2000 to 37.4 per 
cent by end-June 2003.  
• Pakistan's external debt burden has also declined signifi-
cantly. External debt and foreign exchange liabilities as 
percentage of foreign exchange earnings stood at 335.4 
percent in end-June 1999. It is expected to decline to 193 
per cent by end-June 2003.  
• Since, Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves have reached 
a comfortable level the government will be paying back 
expensive debt ahead of the time. This will reduce the 
country's debt burden even further.  
 The Take-off School contends [17] these macro-
economic improvements have set the stage for a return to a 
higher growth path. The acceleration started in 2001-02 
when the growth rate in real GDP was was 3.1%, up from 
1.85 in the previous year. This was followed by rates of 
growth of 4.7 in 2002-03 and 7.5% in 2003-04 (Table 1). 
This was the highest growth achieved since 1991-92. Based 
on these favorable developments the government has confi-
dently forecast rising rates of growth over the next several 
years led by an expansion in textile manufacturing and con-
struction. 
 In short, the Take-off School contends [18] that by 2002-
03 macroeconomic stability had been achieved, both invest-
ment and growth were rising; interest rates were falling; in-
flation was low; private sector credit had picked up; both 
domestic and external debt levels were declining; exports 
were picking up, tax collection was rising, current account 
balance was in surplus; and the exchange rate was stable.  
 In turn this foundation paid great dividends in setting the 
stage for a major expansion of the economy in the 2003-
2004 to 2006-2007 period [19]: 
• Barring two years, GDP grew at an average rate of 3.8% 
in the 1990s. It grew at an average of 7.0% from 2003-04 
through 2006-07. 
• Investment recovered strongly to an average of almost 
18.0% during the 2003-04 through 2006-07 period as op-
posed to 15.6% in 1998-99. 
• Unemployment declined as growth accelerated – from 
8.3% in 2001-02 to 6.2% in 2005-06. 
• In the six years from FY 2000 the economy created 10.4 
million jobs. 
• From 2000-01 through 2004-05 12.8 million people were 
brought out of poverty 
• While inflation had been in double digits through most of 
the 1990s it averaged 5.6% over the 20001-02 to 2006-07 
period. 
• While Pakistan sustained very large budget deficit in the 
1990s, it had been halved in the last seven years (2001-02 
through 2006-07). 
• Due to the generous rescheduling of long-term debt obli-
gations, the debt burden has eased to a manageable level, 
both in terms of external debt and total debt as a propor-
tion to GDP. As a result, interest payments as a percent 
of total revenue declined from 51.2% in 1999-2000 to 
20.6% in 2006-07. 
• The current account deficit remained high in the 1990s 
despite low economic growth. In contrast it has widened 
recently on account of strong economic activity. 
• Pakistan’s exchange rate appreciated from July 2001 
through April 2004, depreciated a bit and since March 
2005 has remained stable. 
• Foreign exchange reserves which averaged around $1.5 
billion in the 1990s, reached $14.5 billion in 2006-07. 
• Foreign investment (FDI) has been rising steadily and 
sharply, with net FDI reaching 2.7% of GDP up from 
0.7% in 2001-02. 
• The country’s credit rating has gradually improved in the 
Musharraf years, with the Moody’s rating increasing 
from Caa1 in 2000 to B1 by the end of 2006. 
• Remittances have shown steady increases from $1,087 
million in 2000-01 to $5,500 in 2006-07. 
• Public debt burden has declined sharply from 100.3 % of 
GDP in 1999 to 52.0% in 2007. External debt as a per-
centage of foreign exchange earnings declined from 
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347% in 1998-99 to 180.5 in 2003-04 and 111.2 in 2006-
07. External debt as a % of GDP has declined by about 
one half since 2001-02 -- from 52.2% to 25.04 in 2006-
07. Similarly debt servicing declined from 24.0% to 9.1 
in 2005-06. 
• The Karachi Stock Exchange has been one of the best 
performing among emerging markets. Market capitaliza-
tion (as a percentage of GDP) has increased from 9.0% in 
2000 to 35.3% in 2006. 
• As a result of its improved economic performance, Paki-
stan has been able to enter the international capital mar-
kets with three sovereign bonds issues. The country also 
extended its yield curve from 5-years to 30-years in just 
two years. 
• Social development is also improving, and although the 
Human Development Index (HDI) value of 0.539 is low 
by international standards, it has risen fast over the last 
decade [20]. 
 Vision 2030 [21] provides some detail of the longer-term 
changes envisaged by the Take-off School: [22] 
 Growing economically at a rate of around 7-8 percent per 
annum, Pakistan expects to join the ranks of middle-
income countries, with a GDP of around USD 4,000 by 
2030. This high growth rate would be sustained through 
developing its human resources and by developing the 
necessary physical and technological infrastructure. 
 The growth trajectory will gain momentum by the latent 
capacities of a sizeable middle class emerging in the 
development process. Besides sustaining high growth 
rates, benefits of growth are planned to be equitably dis-
tributed and poverty to be largely eliminated. 
 Vision 2030 acknowledges the forces of globalization 
and dispersion of information and technology, which are 
likely to dramatically change the scale and character of 
human enterprise. By 2030 human lives, workplaces, 
education, skills, trade and competition would stand 
Table 1. Economic Performance Under Pervez Musuarraf 





(Annual changes in percent)  
Real GDP (factor cost) 1.8 3.1 4.7 7.5 9.0 6.6 7.0 6.5-7.0 
Real GDP (market prices)   4.8 7.4 7.7 6.9 6.4  
Consumer Prices 4.4 2.5 3.1 4.6 9.3 7.9 7.8 7.0 
Real per-capita GDP -0.2 1.1 2.2 5.4 6.9 4.6 5.2 4.6 
(percent of GDP)  
Gross National Savings 15.6 19.0 21.6 18.4 17.7 17.7 18.0 18.7 
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Net FDI Inflows   0.9 0.9 1.3 2.7 3.5  



























Current account including official transfers -1.6 2.2 4.9 1.8 -1.4 -3.9 -4.9 -4.8 
(millions $US)  
End of period gross official reserves   1,679.00   4,330.00   9,529.00   10,564.00   9,805.00   10,760.00   14,287.00   16,158.00  
External Debt    33,352.00   33,307.00   34,037.00   35,679.00   37,461.00   39,593.00  
Gross Financing Needs    270.00   1,608.00   3,968.00   7,168.00   9,131.00   10,129.00  
Source: International Monetary Fund Article IV Consultation, various issues 
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transformed. We are determined to manage these global 
forces of change to our advantage. 
 Unfortunately for the take-off school things did not turn 
out the way proponents envisaged: 
• The Planning Commission’s ambitious expectation of a 
7.5-8.0 percent GDP growth in 2007-08 did not occur 
and has been revised to 6.5%. The reasons given have 
ranged from high international prices and inflation to a 
widening of the current account deficit and increased ex-
ternal debt.  
• Rising prices of food items, combined with shortages of 
sugar, oil and flour, a looming power and gas crisis also 
worked to dampen the Musharraf economic expansion. 
• Industrial growth has dipped to an average of 6 percent in 
the last several years with the critical textile sector show-
ing signs of weakness. 
• The agricultural sector still employing a large share of 
the workforce has not expanded as hoped resulting in in-
creased food insecurity for large segments of the popula-
tion. 
 In sharp contrast to the take-off school, the failed-take-
off school, while acknowledging the macroeconomic ac-
complishments of the Musharraf years, feels that the 
Musharraf strategy as actually applied did not adequately 
implement its economic strategy outlined above [23]. Instead 
its programs resulted in the creation of more distortions in 
the economy and society [24]. Combined with the country’s 
latent governance and institutional deficiencies the result 
was the creation of serious imbalances throughout the econ-
omy. In turn, these imbalances are the source of much of the 
violence and discontent currently destabilizing the economy 
in particular and Pakistani society in general.  
 The leading proponent of this school is Shahid Javed 
Burki, a former Minister of Finance and World Bank Vice 
President who feels that despite early positive signs [25] the 
Government missed a golden opportunity in the 2005-06 
budget to put the country on a new growth path [26]: 
In sum, I believe that the budget has missed the opportu-
nity to put forward a carefully thought-out strategy for 
sustaining growth, alleviating poverty, modernizing the 
economy and improving its efficiency. With growth hav-
ing resumed this was a good opportunity to soberly re-
flect about the future and set the stage for the country’s 
long-term development. 
 The failed-take off school views the main advantage of 
the Musharraf economic policies as implemented to be its 
pro-business orientation of allowing the private sector con-
siderable room in which to operate. While this policy un-
leashed considerable entrepreneurial activity, it should have 
been accompanied by on-going improvements in govern-
ance, economic freedom and financial reform – all necessary 
requirements to complete the takeoff and continue on a path 
of sustained growth and development [27].  
 While some reforms in both areas did take place, there 
are major areas where governance and economic freedom 
actually deteriorated during this period. For example, the 
World Bank considers improved governance in five key ar-
eas as critical for increases in efficiency and higher invest-
ment rates needed to achieve sustained growth (1) voice and 
accountability, (2) political stability, (3) government effec-
tiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) con-
trol of corruption. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s progress during 
the Musharraf years was spotty and inconsistent, especially 
in comparison with India’s relatively steady progress during 
the same period (Table 2).  
 As anticipated there was a major decline in voice and 
accountability with Pakistan falling from a percentile rank of 
27.4 in 1998 to 12.5 in 2006. Political stability already in the 
bottom 10 percent declined even further ending up at 4.80 in 
2006. On the other hand the government was able to forge 
significant gains in government effectiveness and regulatory 
quality, with smaller improvements in the rule of law. Unfor-
tunately this progress was neutralized somewhat by in-
creased corruption.  
 An even more inconsistent pattern occurred in areas re-
lated to economic freedom (Table 3). Pakistan scores [28] 
moderately well in fiscal freedom, business freedom, and 
labor freedom, but its only exceptionally high score is for 
limited government size. In line with its pro-business orien-
tation, major gains were made during the Musharraf years in 
business freedom – the overall freedom to start, operate and 
close a business. The corporate tax rate is high, but tax reve-
nue and government spending are low relative to GDP. 
Commercial registration and licensing are historically ineffi-
cient, but efforts to liberalize the business climate are pro-
ducing results. 
 Trade liberalization progressed under Musharraf, but 
import bans and restrictions, import taxes, inconsistent stan-
dards administration, non-transparent government procure-
ment, export subsidies weak enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and corruption add considerably to the cost of 
trade. The net effect appears to have undermined the gov-
ernment’s efforts at becoming more integrated into the world 
economy (Table 4). Between 2003 and 2007 Pakistan de-
clined from the 50th most globalized country to 63rd. This 
deterioration in relative globalization was across all dimen-
sions of globalization, economic, personal, technological and 
political. To the country’s credit, the declines in some areas 
were not as great as those experienced by its South-Asia 
neighbors, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 
 Unfortunately, in the other areas of economic freedom, 
Pakistan suffered significant reversals during the Musharraf 
years. Major declines occurred in investment freedom, fi-
nancial freedom property rights and freedom from corruption 
during this period. The lack of significant financial reform 
during the Musharraf years is confirmed by the country’s 
rankings in the Milken Institute’s Capital Access Index (Ta-
ble 5). This index indicates measures the extent to which 
countries are creating the conditions necessary for firms to 
raise capital. Specifically countries are ranked in terms of 
how well they support economic activity by providing busi-
nesses with access to capital, both domestic and foreign [29]. 
 For the index as a whole, Pakistan ranked in 65th in 2003 
– that is firms in 65 countries had better access to capital 
than those in Pakistan. By 2007 the country had fallen to 
72nd place. Even more troubling the Milken assessment of 
the country’s macroeconomic environment, the focus of the 
Musharraf programs had achieved only marginal improve-
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Table 2. Governance Comparisons: Pakistan and India 
 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996 
% Change 
1998-06 
Voice and Accountability  
Pakistan 
Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 


















Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 

















Political Stability  
Pakistan 
Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 


















Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 

















Government Effectiveness  
Pakistan 
Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 


















Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 

















Regulatory Quality  
Pakistan 
Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 


















Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 

















Rule of Law  
Pakistan 
Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 


















Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 

















Control of Corruption  
Pakistan 
Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 


















Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5) 

















Source: Compiled from: World Bank, Governance Matters 2007: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2006. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp 
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Table 3. Changes in Economic Freedom During the Musharraf Years 
Country 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
% Change 
199 8-08 
Economic Freedom Summary Score 
Pakistan  56.8 58.2 59.5 53.3 53.2 55.5 53.7 51.9 55.9 53.4 57.9 -1.8 
Bangladesh  44.9 47.8 54.4 47.0 49.7 49.0 46.7 47.2 47.1 48.2 43.9 2.2 
India 54.2 55.6 52.3 54.4 51.8 51.6 51.4 47.1 45.7 48.1 44.9 20.8 
Sri Lanka 58.3 59.3 60.1 58.6 59.9 60.9 62.3 64.3 61.6 62.7 66.1 -11.8 
Business Freedom (Regulation) 
Pakistan  70.8 70.9 72.1 50 50 50 30 30 30 30 30 136.0 
Bangladesh  55.3 64.3 68.0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 453.0 
India 50.0 49.6 49.9 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 66.6 
Sri Lanka 71.5 69.2 69.2 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 70 2.1 
Trade Freedom 
Pakistan  65.2 53.6 54.0 49.6 50.6 59.2 54.0 44.4 58.0 44.0 50.0 30.4 
Bangladesh  0.0 0.0 48.2 54.0 58.0 58.0 50.6 48.8 52.0 54.0 0.0  
India 51.0 51.2 24.0 58.0 43.6 43.0 41.9 45.6 39.6 44.0 4.4 1059.1 
Sri Lanka 69.6 66.6 66.4 71.6 65.6 65.2 67.0 65.2 66.0 63.0 76.0 -8.4 
Fiscal Freedom 
Pakistan  79.1 82.0 80.9 79.8 78.8 77.2 82.6 88.0 88.0 85.7 78.3 1.0 
Bangladesh  84.0 89.4 89.4 89.4 84.8 84.8 84.9 84.8 84.8 84.8 82.0 2.5 
India 75.7 84.8 84.9 83.6 83.1 85.5 85.5 85.6 85.6 85.5 78.3 -3.3 
Sri Lanka 73.5 85.7 85.7 85.7 86.6 82.3 82.2 82.3 81.9 81.8 81.6 -9.9 
Government Size 
Pakistan  90.1 89.3 88.7 88.1 85.1 81.7 85.1 88.9 74.9 72.2 73.8 22.0 
Bangladesh  93.2 91.5 93.2 93.1 93.6 93.0 92.1 92.5 88.7 93.6 92.4 0.8 
India 73.5 89.0 74.3 75.0 75.2 70.8 76.1 74.6 72.9 86.1 85.4 -13.9 
Sri Lanka 81.7 85.7 91.3 81.6 80.1 81.7 82.4 81.9 81.6 75.7 70.7 15.6 
Monetary Freedom 
Pakistan  72.2 72.0 74.5 74.0 78.4 78.1 76.6 75.4 72.3 68.8 69.0 4.6 
Bangladesh  68.9 68.7 74.9 76.3 78.9 80.8 72.7 68.6 68.1 71.0 71.1 -3.0 
India 70.3 77.2 77.6 77.4 77.1 77.6 70.8 68.3 63.7 67.2 65.6 7.1 
             
Sri Lanka 65.4 69.8 72.7 72.3 69.6 68.7 79.4 79.1 75.0 74.0 77.0 -15.1 
Pakistan  40 50 50 30 50 50 50 50 70 70 70 -42.9 
Bangladesh  20 30 30 30 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 -60.0 
India 40 40 50 50 50 50 50 30 30 30 50 -20.0 
Sri Lanka 30 30 30 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 -40.0 
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(Table 3) contd…. 




Pakistan  30 40 50 30 30 50 50 50 50 50 50 -40.0 
Bangladesh  20 20 30 10 30 30 30 30 30 30 50 -60.0 
India 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 0.0 
Sri Lanka 40 40 30 30 50 50 50 50 50 70 70 -42.9 
Property Rights 
Pakistan  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 50 -40.0 
Bangladesh  25 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 -16.7 
India 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 0.0 
Sri Lanka 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 70 50 50 50 0.0 
Freedom From Corruption 
Pakistan  22 21.0 21.0 25.0 26.0 23.0 25.0 10 30 30 50 -56.0 
Bangladesh  20 17.0 15.0 13.0 12.0 4.0 0.0 10 10 10 10 100.0 
India 33 29.0 28.0 28.0 27.0 27.0 28.0 10 10 10 10 230.0 
Sri Lanka 31 32.0 35.0 34.0 37.0 50.0 50.0 50 50 50 50 -38.0 
Source: Heritage Foundation, Economic Freedom of the World, various issues. 
 
ments in recent years, improving its ranking from 112th place 
in 2005 to 104th by 2007. In equity market development the 
country fell from 15th place in 2005 to 40th by 2007. A simi-
lar situation occurred in bond market development where the 
country declined from 52nd place in 2005 to 63rd in 2007. No 
doubt the failure to reform and develop the financial system 
has contributed to the country’s relatively low savings rate 
and its inability to channel investment into the most produc-
tive sectors of the economy – two critical areas needed to 
sustain rates of growth in the 6-8% range. 
 The government’s economic strategy, together with the 
institutional deficiencies noted above are seen [30] by the 
failed take-off school to lead to a number of specific factors 
likely to increasingly constrain growth. While some of these 
factors are clearly the result of institutional or governance 
deficiencies, others appear to be more related to poor deci-
sion making on the part of the Musharraf administration 
compounded by the fact that there is a tendency for authori-
tarian regimes to be less responsive than democracies to 
problems facing the average citizen. Behind the numbers and 
trends one gets a better idea of the dynamics of the Mushar-
raf era. 
 First, while the country has been able to attract more for-
eign investment most of these funds did not go into the ex-
port sector but instead went into activities satisfying domes-
tic demand. This will produce problems for the future since 
it will likely increase pressure on the external accounts. This 
stems directly from the lack of reforms in the trade area lim-
iting the extent to which has been integrated into the world 
economy. 
 Second, the regime also failed to put in place a strategy 
that takes care of the supply bottlenecks that would inevita-
bly result from a sharp increase in GDP. In particular the 
government failed to plan to meet the supply-demand gap in 
the energy sector for both electricity and gas. By 2006-7 the 
situation had developed into a full blown crisis. Electricity 
shortages caused many firms to maintain shorter hours with 
distinct losses in output. There was mounting concern that 
the power shortage would affect the productive capacity and 
export performance of the country.  
 In all fairness to the Musharraf administration the energy 
crisis did not emerge all of a sudden and it is the result of 
neglecting the supply side for the past few decades. Begin-
ning in the early 1980s, the gap between the consumption 
and generation of electricity steadily expanded, but no aug-
menting measures were initiated [31]. Nor until very recently 
were the energy problems facing the country examined in 
any sort comprehensive way [32].  
 On the other hand the Musharraf administration has done 
little to help broad In an exhaustive study of the country’s 
infrastructure situation, the World Bank was forced to con-
clude [33] 
Pakistan suffers from a dearth of infrastructure in the wa-
ter, irrigatin, power, and transport sectors; infrastructure 
which is essential for sustained growth and competitive-
ness both in the local and international markets. The gaps 
between demand and supply in these sectors are alarm-
ing. Unless plans are put in place urgently, these critical 
shortages could lead to increased social discontent and 
disharmony amongst the federation and the provinces. 
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 Third, the tax base remains narrow and rather inflexible. 
The Musharraf government failed to realize that major fiscal 
reforms were needed to prevent growth from widening in-
come inequalities and failing to pull large segments of the 
population out of poverty [34].  
• Only around 2% of the population pays direct income 
taxes with the bulk of the tax burden falling on the poor, 
the salaried class and the business sector. Around 70% of 
tax revenue is generated by indirect taxes that are gener-
ally considered regressive.  
• There is a mismatch between sectoral contributions to 
growth and tax revenue. Agriculture contributes 22.5% of 
GDP, but only 1.2% of tax revenue as compared with 
manufacturing, which contributes 18.% of GDP, but 62% 
of revenue from taxes. 
• Tax evasion is widespread. The exemption of agricultural 
incomes from direct income taxes is believed to be an 
important source of tax evasion, for example, enabling 
industrialists to hide income by buying agricultural prop-
erty. 
• Agricultural incomes have subject to tax exemptions 
since 1886. The prime beneficiaries of agricultural tax 
exemption are large landowners. Approximately 40% of 
the labor force is employed in the agricultural sector, but 
over half of the rural population is landless.  
 In addition to paying more than their fair share of taxes, 
there is a reason why the poor did not benefit as much from 
the Musharraf economic expansion. This was due to the fact 
that growth came from the sectors which did not provide 
much employment to lower income groups. Much of the 














Globalization Summary Score 
Pakistan 63 56 50 46 50 -26.0 
India 71 61 61 61 56 -26.8 
Bangladesh 64 58 58 56 54 -18.5 
Sri Lanka 56 46 43 51 44 -27.3 
Economic Dimension 
Pakistan 63 60 53 55 60 -5.0 
India 66 59 59 61 61 -8.2 
Bangladesh 67 61 61 62 62 -8.1 
Sri Lanka 55 38 34 41 44 -25.0 
Personal Dimension 
Pakistan 42 34 33 36 37 -13.5 
India 59 51 48 53 49 -20.4 
Bangladesh 43 37 35 43 39 -10.3 
Sri Lanka 32 27 26 34 28 -14.3 
Technological Dimension 
Pakistan 60 59 59 59 56 -7.1 
India 63 57 56 55 54 -16.7 
Bangladesh 72 62 62 62 59 -22.0 
Sri Lanka 68 58 57 56 53 -28.3 
Political Dimension 
Pakistan 64 55 52 34 18 -255.6 
India 69 60 60 57 14 -392.9 
Bangladesh 54 49 53 35 24 -125.0 
Sri Lanka 60 58 56 60 55 -9.1 
Source, Foreign Policy Index of Globalization, various issues. 
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Table 5. Pakistan's Progress in Financial Development 
2007 2006 2005 
 Rank Index Rank Index Rank Index 
Over-all Capital Access Index  [4.71]  [4.64]  [4.59] 
Pakistan 72 4.06 65 4.23 74 3.79 
India 41 5.50 46 5.18 53 4.58 
Sri Lanka 70 4.11 66 4.21 64 4.27 
Bangladesh 92 3.24 97 3.32 87 3.43 
Macroeconomic Environment   [6.03]  [5.95]  [6.07] 
Pakistan 104 4.25 112 3.75 112 3.75 
India 60 6.00 71 5.50 76 5.50 
Sri Lanka 67 5.50 84 5.00 64 5.83 
Bangladesh 89 4.83 96 4.67 64 5.83 
Institutional Environment  [5.36]  [5.40]  [5.31] 
Pakistan 61 5.18 70 4.82 79 4.41 
India 63 5.12 54 5.29 79 4.41 
Sri Lanka 78 4.65 74 4.71 65 4.82 
Bangladesh 109 3.35 97 3.88 98 3.71 
Financial and Banking Institutions  [4.58]  [4.56]  [4.66] 
Pakistan 76 3.44 47 5.00 64 4.40 
India 39 5.78 50 4.90 58 4.60 
Sri Lanka 48 4.89 62 4.30 48 5.00 
Bangladesh 79 3.33 62 4.30 72 4.00 
Equity Market Development  [3.39]  [3.48]  [3.57] 
Pakistan 40 4.67 33 5.67 15 7.33 
India 21 6.33 25 6.17 20 6.83 
Sri Lanka 63 3.17 43 4.67 46 4.50 
Bangladesh 60 3.33 72 2.33 66 3.00 
Bond Market Development  [3.45]  [3.46]  [2.52] 
Pakistan 63 2.75 43 4.75 52 2.50 
India 35 5.25 29 5.75 46 2.75 
Sri Lanka 65 2.50 51 4.00 55 2.00 
Bangladesh 75 1.50 68 1.75 75 0.00 
Alternative Sources of Capital  [3.07]  [2.47]  [2.86] 
Pakistan 69 2.00 61 1.75 82 1.00 
India 29 5.00 33 3.75 42 3.50 
Sri Lanka 73 1.75 61 1.75 74 1.50 
Bangladesh 92 0.75 86 0.75 91 0.50 
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2007 2006 2005 
 Rank Index Rank Index Rank Index 
International Funding  [4.13]  [4.06]  [4.22] 
Pakistan 70 4.17 67 3.67 85 3.75 
India 42 4.83 53 4.25 40 4.83 
Sri Lanka 89 3.42 86 3.08 102 3.08 
Bangladesh 95 3.00 94 2.67 105 2.92 
Table 5 Notes 
Data from: Milken Institute, Capital Market Access, various issues (Santa Monica: Milken Institute). 
[ ] = mean value 
Macroeconomic Environment captures the extent to which a country's macroeconomic environment is favorable to running and financing a business. 
Institutional environment reflects the extent to which a country has the institutions needed to support and enhance business financing activities. 
Financial and Banking Institutions measures the level of involvement of deposit-taking institutions in financing business. 
Equity Market Development reflects the extent to which financing of business operations is important for a given country. 
 
increase in GDP came from the sectors which returned high 
rewards to the investors but in which the share of wages was 
relatively low. Real estate development was one of the im-
portant sectors of the economy as was the modern service 
sector. Neither, at least in the context of Pakistan, generated 
employment and income for the poorer segments of the 
population [35]. 
 Another area where the Musharraf administration failed 
to make any progress at reform was the country’s sprawling 
military industrial complex or Milbus. Over the years, Paki-
stan’s military has expanded its holding of industries, prop-
erties and foundations. These organizations guarantee the 
armed forces both organizational autonomy and a regular 
flow of resources from the public and private sectors – often 
to the enrichment of senior officers, both on-duty and retired.  
 The military has come to control 11.58 million acres of 
state land or 12% of the total. Much of this is rented at very 
low fees to its personnel. The estimated total wealth of this 
sector varies but may be as high as $100 billion and no doubt 
expanded even further during the Musharraf era. From an 
economic perspective these activities are nothing like the 
leading industries in Rostow’s take-off stage. Instead, Mil-
bus places a tremendous drag on any economic expansion 
[36]: 
The financial inefficiency of these business ventures 
places a financial cost on the state. Some of the financial 
burden…is borne by the state by providing financial 
guarantees or providing loans to the military controlled 
companies. The financial aid given to these foundations 
is detrimental to the growth of a free-market economy. 
…The linkage between the state and tese companies, and 
its impact on the overall business environment, is not the 
only opportunity cost. The presence of th military in the 
private sector or in profit-making activities results in en-
couraging crony capitalism in the country. This creates a 
situation where the dominant cflasses collude with the 
military to benefit from the state and its resources at the 
risk of ignoring all those who are not part of the ‘elite 
consensus’. 
 Finally, under Musharraf, the country became vulnerable 
to reductions in external capital flows. The vulnerability of 
the economy to external flows is revealed by the data on 
investments and the sources for financing it. During the 
Musharraf period, efforts to increase private investment 
achieved some success with the rate of investment increasing 
by about a third -- from 13.9 per cent of GDP in 2001-02 to 
18.0 per cent in 2006-07 (Table 1). However during this pe-
riod gross national savings declined from 19.0 percent of 
GDP to 18.7 percent. This suggests that the economy, con-
trary to government statements is becoming increasingly 
dependent on foreign capital. Given the country’s political 
instability and lack of significant progress in governance and 
economic reforms, this further increases the country’s vul-
nerability to a fall-off in foreign capital. At this point any 
major reduction in foreign capital inflows could precipitate a 
sharp economic down-turn [37].  
 As Burki observes, [38] Pakistan will face severe compe-
tition for foreign capital and may be less competitive in this 
regard unless major changes occur: 
One of the positive features of the way the Musharraf 
government managed the economy is to have made it at-
tractive for some foreign investors. But Pakistan has not 
become an important destination for investors as India 
has over the last decade. India offers the promise of po-
litical stability, a legal system that can protect investors, a 
highly trained workforce, and a fairly large rate of do-
mestic savings. It also has a large domestic market which 
is of interest to foreign companies. 
 Unless major reforms overcome deficiencies in govern-
ance, economic freedom, and capital market access, the 
failed take off school is skeptical the country will be able to 
maintain or even approach the growth rates obtained in the 
last several years—limitations in these areas will increas-
ingly constrain investment and efficiency thus producing an 
increasingly heavy drag on the economy. In short, the coun-
try will fail in its efforts to take-off because it did not create 
the institutional and governance conditions necessary for a 
rapid and prolonged expansion of the economy. 
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 This conclusion is reinforced by recent empirical evi-
dence [39] that suggests Pakistan’s defense expenditures 
have a negative impact of economic growth due largely to 
the fact that the country’s allocations to the military are high 
relative to the levels of governance attained to date. This 
remained the case throughout the Musharraf years. The im-
plications of these finding for the country’s take off are 
clear[40]: 
Our findings and the literature suggest that the opportu-
nity cost of these increased (defense) expenditures will 
be relatively high in the long run. Pakistan’s infrastruc-
ture will continue to deteriorate, further degrading its 
ability to generate economic growth and increasing do-
mestic instability. This destructive cycle of increased de-
fense expenditures – reduced economic growth can be 
mitigated however, if Pakistan is able to increase institu-
tional capacity and quality.  
 Given the lack of institutional development in such key 
areas as control of corruption other types of government ex-
penditure may have also hit diminishing returns of this sort 
and thus further contributed to the slowdown of the overall 
economy beginning in 2007. In most countries the slowing 
of growth does not necessarily cause political problems un-
less the previous gains from growth were inequitably distrib-
uted. Unfortunately for the Musharraf administration this 
seems to have been the case. A pro-business policy bias, lack 
of democratic feed-back and an authoritarian-style of policy-
making are also not conducive to broad-based development 
[41]: 
The government headed by General Pervez Musharraf 
was confident that its economic record, with GDP in-
creasing at an unprecedented seven percent a year for 
five years would be appreciated by the majority of the 
citizenry. Its confidence was so great that it was not pre-
pared to listen to those who were sending signals of cau-
tion. Many commentators ……kept on reminding Is-
lamabad that macro numbers were hiding many micro 
problems. But Islamabad was in no mood to listen and 
has paid a price by sending the country into a spiral of 
political discontent that has gone on for nine months.  
 While no detailed studies of income distribution are 
available for the last several years, Burki feels confident that 
around 10 million belong to the class that has benefitted 
from economic growth and restructuring, 25 million would 
have entered the system had it not been disrupted and 45 
million who were completely ignored [42]. Furthermore he 
notes a regional dimension of inequality has emerged from 
the Musharrf era. The benefits of growth were largely con-
fided to central and northern Punjab and such large cities as 
Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Faisalabad and Gujranwala 
[43]. 
 The failed-takeoff school contends that Pakistan’s politi-
cal history suggests that economic developments can create 
great political instability. This happened towards the end of 
previous failed take-offs. The first was associated with 
President Ayub Khan in the 1960s when there was wide-
spread perception that the benefits of the extraordinary eco-
nomic expansion during this period went to a very limited 
number of prominent families [44]. There is no doubt that 
the authoritarian growth model developed in the 1960s also 
created a wide disparity of income between the two regions 
of Pakistan, East Pakistan and West Pakistan leading to the 
country’s breakup. In the second case, similar, but less dra-
matic, changes took place in the late 1980s at the end of the 
Zia authoritarian era. 
 In both cases the aggrieved resorted to violence to 
achieve their goals [45]. Fortunately for the country, this 
time they simply voted. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Given the difficulty, the country has had over the years in 
sustaining high rates of growth, the Musharraf programs and 
reforms will no doubt be ultimately judged on the quality of 
the institutions put in place. Are these institutions capable of 
fairly resolving many of the conflicts that have repeatedly 
derailed the economy? Will they permit continuity in eco-
nomic policy? Will they strengthen democracy, enabling all 
segments of society better access to public services and op-
portunities? Will they enable the country to finally have a 
successful economic transition to high sustained growth? 
 The pro-administration, take-off school contends that 
through its macroeconomic stabilization policies and pro-
gress in economic and governance reforms the country is 
now positioned to sustain high rates of economic growth – 
the previous boom bust pattern of growth made a thing of the 
past – the recent slow-down of the economy simply reflects 
the political uncertainty prior to the election. Now that that 
has been resolved the country will quickly resume the rapid 
pace of growth of the last several Musharraf years.  
 The failed take-off explanation while acknowledging the 
many economic successes of the Musharraf years contended 
that the administration did not make enough progress in gov-
ernance and supporting growth enhancing institutions for 
growth to be sustainable. Even worse, the Musharraf gov-
ernment’s polices and actions not only failed to address 
mounting constraints, but in many cases only served to ag-
gravate them.  
 From the vantage point of early 20008 it may be prema-
ture to provide a final judgment of the Musharraf economic 
policies. However a large body of evidence points toward 
their failure. Certainly, dissatisfaction with the performance 
of the economy was one of the main reasons for his fall from 
power and while some of his reforms have yet to be com-
pleted they are unlikely to create the conditions for high sus-
tained grates of growth. Or, as so eloquently put by Burki 
[46]: 
…. the conditions just don’t exist in Pakistan which can 
support a high rate of economic growth, alleviate poverty 
and improve the distribution of income. We don’t save 
enough from our national income to accumulate capital. 
We have not trained our large and growing workforce to 
help modernize the economy and take advantage of the 
window of opportunity that exists as a result of falling 
rates of fertility in the developed world. 
 By election time in early 2008, these economic subtleties 
as well as the harsh realities of rising food and energy prices 
were becoming more and more apparent to broad segments 
of the Pakistani electorate. 
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